Zytra Agent Gateway

The execution boundary
your agents are missing.

API gateways secure REST calls. LLM proxies route model traffic. Neither was built for agents — with goals, tool chains, memory contexts, and injection paths no HTTP gateway understands. Zytra Agent Gateway governs the full execution context of every agentic call.

0.5% AgentHarm FPR

11.6ms p50 latency · RTX 4090

0.994 HackaPrompt R-score

Fail-closed Default on error

Execution boundary — every agent call

AI Agents

kyc-agent

credit-agent

advisor

collections

→

Zytra Gateway

Aval Gateway

authenticated · governed · sealed

Identity Goal-bind Bi-dir scan Seal

→

Targets

LLM

MCP servers

Core banking

External APIs

Why every other gateway fails agents

They were built for requests, not reasoning chains.

An agent call carries a goal, a tool chain, retrieval results, and memory context — not just a payload. Gateways that don't understand this leave your most dangerous attack surfaces entirely ungoverned.

API Gateway · Kong / Apigee / AWS APIM

Rate-limits REST calls. Zero AI awareness.

Designed for microservices. Sees HTTP verb plus path. Has no concept of a prompt, a tool invocation, a goal scope, or a system message. Injection payloads transit as valid JSON.

✗ Goal-binding ✗ Tool governance ✗ Prompt scan

LLM Proxy · LiteLLM / Portkey / Helicone

Routes model traffic. Optimises cost.

Abstracts model vendors, tracks spend. Security is an afterthought — basic keyword filters on the request side only. No response scanning, no tool allow-lists, no fail-closed mode.

✗ Fail-closed ✗ Response scan ✗ Evidence chain

AI Guardrail · Lakera / Prompt Security

Filters prompts. Misses the agent layer.

Strong at blocking direct jailbreaks in a single turn. No visibility into MCP tool calls, goal state, or memory retrieval. A malicious instruction embedded in tool output bypasses every prompt-level guard.

✗ Tool governance ✗ Goal-binding ✗ OSCAL audit

Cloud AI · Bedrock Guardrails / Azure AI Foundry

Cloud-locked. No evidence your examiner accepts.

Guardrails that work only inside one vendor's model runtime. Data leaves your perimeter. No RBI or DPDP evidence artifacts, no hash-chained ledger, no OSCAL export, no tenant deployment.

✗ Tenant deploy ✗ Regulatory evidence ✗ Multi-cloud

Enforcement in five stages

One execution boundary. Every agent call passes through it.

Each stage adds a layer of assurance. Fail at any stage: closed — not passed through. No bypass mode exists in regulated deployment.

Authenticate

Verify workload identity via SPIFFE SVID or API key. Classify cert as classical, hybrid, or PQC. Unregistered workloads are rejected before any payload is read.

Bind Goal

Match the agent's declared task against its registered scope. A tool chain that exceeds the permitted goal boundary is blocked — regardless of what the model was told to do.

Scan

Run Aval L0 → M2 on the outbound prompt and the inbound model response. Direct jailbreaks, indirect injection in tool outputs, and data exfiltration attempts — caught on both paths.

Enforce

Apply MCP tool allow / deny list. A tool not on the allowlist is never invoked — the call stops at the gateway before it reaches the MCP server.

Seal

Append a hash-chained event record: workload identity, goal verdict, scan result, tool invoked, latency. SHA-256 links each record to the last. Immutable, examination-ready.

Live gateway simulation

Watch agent calls hit the enforcement boundary.

Simulated agent traffic flowing through all five stages in real time. Blocked calls stop at the exact stage where they violate policy — and every verdict is sealed to the ledger.

Six capabilities no other gateway ships

Built for agents, not adapted from API proxies.

Goal-binding

An agent registers a task scope — "process loan application for customer X." Any call whose tool chain exceeds that scope is blocked, regardless of model instruction. The goal is the enforcement boundary, not a soft guideline.

ZYC-GOAL-03 · EU AI Act Art. 13 · goal deviations flagged and logged

Fail-closed by default

Gateway unreachable, scanner timeout, identity check failure — the call is blocked, not passed through. No "allow on error" mode exists in regulated deployment. Your agents cannot operate outside the enforcement boundary.

Default · cannot be disabled in regulated mode

MCP tool allow / deny lists

Each agent gets a catalog of permitted MCP tools. A tool not in the catalog is never invoked — the call stops at the gateway before it reaches the MCP server. No tool can be added dynamically without a governance approval workflow.

Blocks MCP tool-poisoning attack vector · ZYC-MCP-02

Bidirectional scanning

Aval scans both the outbound request and the inbound model response. Indirect prompt injection — where the attack is embedded in a document, tool output, or retrieval result — is caught on the response path. Prompt-only scanners miss this entirely.

ZYC-PID-01 · detection recall ≥ 95% · 99.7% on HackaPrompt

Workload identity, not API keys

SPIFFE SVIDs replace shared API keys. Every agent proves identity with a short-lived X.509 certificate — 1-hour TTL, auto-rotated by SPIRE. Certs are classified classical / hybrid / PQC for quantum readiness tracking. Leaked certs expire. Leaked API keys don't.

SPIFFE/SPIRE · crypto-agility · PQC migration tracking

Hash-chained evidence

Every gateway event appends to an immutable, hash-chained ledger. SHA-256 links each record to the one before it. Backdating a log entry breaks the chain. Export as PDF, OSCAL, or JSON. Your RBI or EU AI Act examiner receives a traceable evidence pack — not a log file.

OSCAL export · 7-year retention · tamper-evident · SHA-256 chain

Gateway comparison

What each gateway actually governs.

Mapped against the attack surfaces that matter for agentic AI in regulated financial services. Published FPR figures used where available; "not published" means the vendor has not disclosed benchmark results.

Capability	API Gateway Kong · Apigee	LLM Proxy LiteLLM · Portkey	AI Guardrail Lakera · Prompt Sec.	Cloud AI Bedrock · Azure AI	Zytra Aval Gateway
Goal-binding	—	—	—	—	✓
MCP tool allow / deny	—	—	—	—	✓
Bidirectional scan	—	request only	request only	partial	✓ both paths
Agentic injection block	—	—	limited	limited	✓
Fail-closed on error	configurable	—	configurable	—	✓ default
Workload identity (SPIFFE)	via plugin	—	—	IAM only	✓ native
Hash-chained audit log	—	—	—	basic logs	✓
OSCAL / RBI evidence export	—	—	—	—	✓
Deploys in your tenant	✓	✓	SaaS only	cloud-only	✓
Published AgentHarm FPR	N/A	N/A	not published	not published	0.5%

Benchmark proof

Vendor-run. Reproducible from the public harness.

FinProof v1 is open-source. Run it on your own infrastructure and compare. AgentHarm figures are on Aval v1.5; FinProof ASSAY and HackaPrompt on v1.4.

0.5%

AgentHarm false-positive rate

AgentHarm · Aval v1.5

0.963

F1 · financial-services safety

FinProof ASSAY v1

99.7%

Harmful recall · prompt injection

HackaPrompt

11.6ms

p50 inference latency

RTX 4090 · Aval v1.5

PromptGuard-86M (Meta): 96.9% FPR on AgentHarm. LlamaGuard-3-1B (Meta) and Granite Guardian (IBM): not run on AgentHarm as of Oct 2026. Lower FPR is better — it measures wrongly blocking legitimate queries as attacks. A gateway with a 96.9% FPR cannot be deployed in production without destroying business utility.

Regulatory alignment

Every gateway event maps to an obligation.

Authentication records, goal-binding verdicts, scan results, and tool invocations are each tagged to the regulatory control they satisfy. Your examiner receives a traceable chain from obligation to evidence — not a log file to interpret.

RBI Draft MRM EU AI Act MAS TRM NIST AI RMF SR 11-7 SEBI · Algo AI DPDP Act 2023 ISO/IEC 42001

Put every agent call inside a governance boundary.

Deploys in your own AWS, Azure, or GCP tenant — or on-premise. No prompts, no data, no models leave your perimeter.

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The execution boundaryyour agents are missing.