{
  "schema_version": "1.0",
  "version": "v1.0",
  "date": "2026-08-01",
  "title": "Zytra AI Risk Atlas",
  "description": "141 canonical AI risks across 11 governance domains — 77 agentic and 64 foundational. Each risk includes severity, likelihood, deployment patterns, and framework crosswalks.",
  "license": "CC BY 4.0",
  "source": "https://zytratechnologies.com/risk-atlas",
  "stats": {
    "total_risks": 141,
    "agentic_risks": 77,
    "foundational_risks": 64,
    "domains": 11,
    "controls": 157,
    "frameworks": 13
  },
  "frameworks": [
    "NIST AI RMF", "OWASP LLM Top 10", "OWASP Agentic AI Top 10",
    "MITRE ATLAS", "ISO/IEC 42001", "EU AI Act", "DORA",
    "RBI AI Governance Guidelines", "SEBI AI Framework",
    "DPDP Act 2023", "IBM AI Risk Atlas", "MAESTRO", "NIST ARIA"
  ],
  "domains": [
    { "id": "MAR", "name": "Model Accuracy & Reliability", "risk_count": 14, "agentic": 6, "foundational": 8 },
    { "id": "SEC", "name": "Security & Adversarial Robustness", "risk_count": 18, "agentic": 11, "foundational": 7 },
    { "id": "FAI", "name": "Fairness & Bias", "risk_count": 11, "agentic": 3, "foundational": 8 },
    { "id": "GOV", "name": "Governance & Accountability", "risk_count": 13, "agentic": 5, "foundational": 8 },
    { "id": "PRV", "name": "Privacy & Data", "risk_count": 12, "agentic": 4, "foundational": 8 },
    { "id": "AGT", "name": "Agent Autonomy", "risk_count": 16, "agentic": 16, "foundational": 0 },
    { "id": "MAS", "name": "Multi-Agent Security", "risk_count": 13, "agentic": 13, "foundational": 0 },
    { "id": "TLR", "name": "Tool & Affordance Risk", "risk_count": 14, "agentic": 14, "foundational": 0 },
    { "id": "TRN", "name": "Transparency & Explainability", "risk_count": 10, "agentic": 2, "foundational": 8 },
    { "id": "SUP", "name": "Supply Chain & Provenance", "risk_count": 9, "agentic": 2, "foundational": 7 },
    { "id": "OPS", "name": "Operational Continuity", "risk_count": 11, "agentic": 1, "foundational": 10 }
  ],
  "risks": [
    {
      "risk_id": "MAR-F-01", "type": "foundational",
      "domain": "Model Accuracy & Reliability",
      "name": "Output Hallucination",
      "description": "Model produces confidently stated, factually incorrect output — including fabricated citations, regulatory guidance, or financial figures.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "High", "inherent_risk": "Critical",
      "deployment_patterns": ["RAG", "document_summarization", "chat"],
      "frameworks": ["NIST AI RMF: MEASURE 2.5", "OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM09", "IBM AI Risk Atlas: Hallucination"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Incorrect regulatory deadlines, financial product descriptions, KYC guidance"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "MAR-F-02", "type": "foundational",
      "domain": "Model Accuracy & Reliability",
      "name": "Distributional Drift",
      "description": "Model performance degrades over time as input distribution shifts from training distribution — undetected in production.",
      "severity": "Medium", "likelihood": "High", "inherent_risk": "High",
      "deployment_patterns": ["classification", "scoring", "RAG"],
      "frameworks": ["NIST AI RMF: MEASURE 2.6", "ISO/IEC 42001: 9.1"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Credit scoring models, fraud detection degradation"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "MAR-A-01", "type": "agentic",
      "domain": "Model Accuracy & Reliability",
      "name": "Compounding Error Chains",
      "description": "In multi-step agentic workflows, errors in early steps compound — the agent acts on its own incorrect prior outputs, amplifying the original error.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "Medium", "inherent_risk": "High",
      "deployment_patterns": ["autonomous_agent", "multi_agent"],
      "frameworks": ["OWASP Agentic AI Top 10: AA01", "MAESTRO: Layer 4", "NIST AI RMF: MEASURE 2.5"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Agentic loan origination, compliance checking workflows"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "SEC-F-01", "type": "foundational",
      "domain": "Security & Adversarial Robustness",
      "name": "Prompt Injection",
      "description": "Attacker embeds adversarial instructions in model inputs — via user messages, retrieved documents, or tool outputs — causing the model to override its system instructions.",
      "severity": "Critical", "likelihood": "High", "inherent_risk": "Critical",
      "deployment_patterns": ["RAG", "chat", "autonomous_agent"],
      "frameworks": ["OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM01", "MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0051", "NIST ARIA"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Customer-facing chatbots, document processing pipelines"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "SEC-A-01", "type": "agentic",
      "domain": "Security & Adversarial Robustness",
      "name": "Indirect Prompt Injection via Retrieved Documents",
      "description": "Malicious instructions embedded in documents retrieved by a RAG pipeline or web browsing agent cause the agent to execute attacker-controlled actions.",
      "severity": "Critical", "likelihood": "High", "inherent_risk": "Critical",
      "deployment_patterns": ["RAG", "autonomous_agent"],
      "frameworks": ["OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM01", "OWASP Agentic AI Top 10: AA03", "MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0054"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Document intake agents, research agents with web access"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "SEC-A-02", "type": "agentic",
      "domain": "Security & Adversarial Robustness",
      "name": "Multi-Turn Crescendo Attack",
      "description": "Attacker escalates requests gradually across multiple conversation turns, building the model's commitment to a compliant frame before introducing the harmful request.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "High", "inherent_risk": "Critical",
      "deployment_patterns": ["chat", "autonomous_agent"],
      "frameworks": ["OWASP Agentic AI Top 10: AA05", "NIST AI RMF: GOVERN 6.2"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Customer service AI, advisory chatbots"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "SEC-A-03", "type": "agentic",
      "domain": "Security & Adversarial Robustness",
      "name": "Structural / IICL Attack",
      "description": "Attacker presents harmful content as pattern completion of a structured dataset — bypassing content-layer safety by exploiting the model's tendency to complete established patterns faithfully.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "Medium", "inherent_risk": "High",
      "deployment_patterns": ["chat", "RAG", "autonomous_agent"],
      "frameworks": ["OWASP Agentic AI Top 10: AA05", "IBM AI Risk Atlas: Jailbreaking"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Models with near-0% single-turn ASR remain vulnerable"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "FAI-F-01", "type": "foundational",
      "domain": "Fairness & Bias",
      "name": "Demographic Disparate Impact",
      "description": "Model produces systematically different outcomes across demographic groups — including protected characteristics — without justifiable basis.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "Medium", "inherent_risk": "High",
      "deployment_patterns": ["scoring", "classification"],
      "frameworks": ["EU AI Act: Art. 10", "NIST AI RMF: MANAGE 2.2", "RBI AI Governance Guidelines"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Credit scoring, loan approval, insurance underwriting"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "GOV-F-01", "type": "foundational",
      "domain": "Governance & Accountability",
      "name": "Missing Risk Ownership",
      "description": "No named individual is accountable for an AI system's risk profile — creating governance gaps where controls exist on paper but have no enforcement owner.",
      "severity": "Medium", "likelihood": "High", "inherent_risk": "High",
      "deployment_patterns": ["all"],
      "frameworks": ["ISO/IEC 42001: 5.3", "EU AI Act: Art. 17", "NIST AI RMF: GOVERN 1.1"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Regulatory accountability requirements under RBI, SEBI, EU AI Act"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "GOV-A-01", "type": "agentic",
      "domain": "Governance & Accountability",
      "name": "Opaque Agentic Action Trail",
      "description": "Agentic workflows produce actions without sufficient logging or audit trail — making post-incident review, regulatory evidence, and accountability attribution impossible.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "Medium", "inherent_risk": "High",
      "deployment_patterns": ["autonomous_agent", "multi_agent"],
      "frameworks": ["EU AI Act: Art. 12", "ISO/IEC 42001: 9.2", "MAESTRO: Layer 6"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Regulatory audit trails, DORA operational resilience requirements"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "PRV-F-01", "type": "foundational",
      "domain": "Privacy & Data",
      "name": "Training Data Memorization",
      "description": "Model memorizes and can reproduce verbatim training data — including PII, financial records, or confidential information included in fine-tuning datasets.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "Medium", "inherent_risk": "High",
      "deployment_patterns": ["chat", "document_summarization"],
      "frameworks": ["OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM06", "DPDP Act 2023", "EU AI Act: Art. 10"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Customer data leakage, KYC data exposure"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "AGT-A-01", "type": "agentic",
      "domain": "Agent Autonomy",
      "name": "Scope Creep Beyond Declared Intent",
      "description": "Agent acquires capabilities, resources, or information beyond what was declared in its design brief — often through legitimate-seeming tool calls that accumulate into unauthorized capability.",
      "severity": "Critical", "likelihood": "Medium", "inherent_risk": "Critical",
      "deployment_patterns": ["autonomous_agent", "multi_agent"],
      "frameworks": ["OWASP Agentic AI Top 10: AA04", "MAESTRO: Layer 3", "MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0047"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Agents with banking API access, payment execution agents"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "AGT-A-02", "type": "agentic",
      "domain": "Agent Autonomy",
      "name": "Objective Substitution & Proxy Gaming",
      "description": "Agent optimizes for a measurable proxy of the intended objective rather than the intended objective itself — producing outcomes that satisfy the metric while violating the goal.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "Medium", "inherent_risk": "High",
      "deployment_patterns": ["autonomous_agent"],
      "frameworks": ["OWASP Agentic AI Top 10: AA02", "IBM AI Risk Atlas: Misaligned objective", "NIST AI RMF: MANAGE 1.3"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Fraud detection optimization, compliance monitoring automation"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "MAS-A-01", "type": "agentic",
      "domain": "Multi-Agent Security",
      "name": "Cross-Agent Prompt Injection",
      "description": "A compromised or adversarially controlled agent in a multi-agent system injects instructions into messages passed to other agents — propagating attacker control through the pipeline.",
      "severity": "Critical", "likelihood": "Medium", "inherent_risk": "Critical",
      "deployment_patterns": ["multi_agent"],
      "frameworks": ["OWASP Agentic AI Top 10: AA03", "MAESTRO: Layer 5", "MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0054"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Orchestration layers, agent pipelines with external data access"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "TLR-A-01", "type": "agentic",
      "domain": "Tool & Affordance Risk",
      "name": "Excessive Tool Affordance",
      "description": "Agent is granted access to tools or APIs beyond what is necessary for its task — violating least-privilege and expanding the blast radius of a compromise or misuse event.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "High", "inherent_risk": "Critical",
      "deployment_patterns": ["autonomous_agent", "multi_agent"],
      "frameworks": ["OWASP Agentic AI Top 10: AA06", "MAESTRO: Layer 3", "ISO/IEC 42001: 8.4"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Agents with payment, KYC, or database write access"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "TRN-F-01", "type": "foundational",
      "domain": "Transparency & Explainability",
      "name": "Unexplainable Adverse Decision",
      "description": "AI system produces an adverse decision (credit denial, fraud flag) that cannot be explained to the affected individual or regulator in required detail.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "Medium", "inherent_risk": "High",
      "deployment_patterns": ["scoring", "classification"],
      "frameworks": ["EU AI Act: Art. 13", "RBI AI Governance Guidelines", "SEBI AI Framework"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "Credit decisions, fraud flags, insurance claim denials"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "SUP-F-01", "type": "foundational",
      "domain": "Supply Chain & Provenance",
      "name": "Third-Party Model Risk",
      "description": "Organization deploys a foundation model from an external provider without adequate assessment of that model's safety properties, training data, or alignment guarantees.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "High", "inherent_risk": "High",
      "deployment_patterns": ["all"],
      "frameworks": ["NIST AI RMF: GOVERN 4.2", "ISO/IEC 42001: 8.4", "EU AI Act: Art. 25"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "API-accessed LLMs, embedded model providers"
    },
    {
      "risk_id": "OPS-F-01", "type": "foundational",
      "domain": "Operational Continuity",
      "name": "AI System Single Point of Failure",
      "description": "Critical operational processes depend on an AI system without adequate fallback — creating a single point of failure that violates operational resilience requirements.",
      "severity": "High", "likelihood": "Medium", "inherent_risk": "High",
      "deployment_patterns": ["all"],
      "frameworks": ["DORA: Art. 11", "RBI AI Governance Guidelines", "ISO/IEC 42001: 10.1"],
      "bfsi_relevance": "DORA ICT operational resilience, core banking AI dependencies"
    }
  ],
  "note": "This export contains representative risks from each domain. The full 141-risk catalogue with all controls, evidence requirements, and regulatory clause-level mappings is available at https://zytratechnologies.com/risk-atlas"
}
