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AgenticTool & MCP Governance

Cross-Server Tool-Composition Policy

Control objective

Cross-Server Tool-Composition Policy checks how tools from different MCP servers can be chained together within a single agent workflow, blocking dangerous combinations that are individually harmless but together enable abuse — for example one server that can read sensitive customer records chained into another that can send data externally. It matters because tool composition creates emergent privilege-escalation and exfiltration paths (OWASP ASI03 and ASI09, MITRE ATLAS T0085) that no single tool's permissions reveal; in banking this is how a benign read tool plus a benign send tool become a data-leak pipeline. To implement, define an explicit policy describing which cross-server tool chains are allowed and which are forbidden, enforce it at the orchestration layer so that any attempt to compose a forbidden chain is intercepted before execution, and log every cross-server composition, the policy decision and any blocked chain as evidence. There is no numeric metric or formula, so operate against the stated threshold: a cross-server composition policy must be enforced and forbidden cross-server chains must be blocked. Any forbidden chain that executes, or absence of an enforced policy, is a High-priority breach that should halt the workflow, alert reviewers and trigger refinement of the composition rules.

Implementation notes

OPA bundle with (source_server, target_server, tool_pair) rules. Default deny on any cross-server data flow until explicitly allowlisted. Inspect the agent's active toolbelt on every prompt; warn on toolbelts spanning > 3 servers; hard-deny on toolbelts spanning servers with conflicting data-classifications.

Risks mitigated

2